Heart of America Northwest
"Advancing Our Region's Quality of Life"
Review of the Hanford Plan to Implement the Bush
Administration's New Goals and Strategies for
Contaminated U.S. Department of Energy (USDOE)
Nuclear Weapons Sites
May 2, 2002
Federal Government Plan
To Make Hanford A National Radioactive Waste Dump;
Hanford Reach National Monument and Columbia River
Would Be "National Nuclear Sacrifice Zone";
Plan Would Leave Deadly High-Level Nuclear Wastes Forever in
Tanks That Have Already Leaked
Background to the Plan:
On May 1, 2002, the U.S. Department of Energy (USDOE) issued its plan ("Performance Management Plan for the Accelerated Cleanup of the Hanford Site") to implement new Bush Administration "goals" and "strategies" for the Hanford Nuclear Reservation, the most contaminated and dangerous area in the hemisphere. Accompanying the President's Budget Request for 2003, Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham issued a "Review" of the USDOE's nuclear waste cleanup program, which included "Calls to Action" to implement new strategies to reduce the cost and timeline for cleanup of all contaminated USDOE facilities. The President's Budget requested $262 million less for Hanford Clean-Up for 2003 than Congress appropriated for 2002 (which was, in reality nearly a $300 million cut because Congress had also given a supplemental appropriation for Hanford Clean-Up). For the entire national program, the Bush Administration requested $800 million less in funding for cleanup of specific sites - but proposed to create an $800 million "Expedited Cleanup Account". The President's Budget Request and Secretary's statements stated that withholding funds was intended to "provide the stimulus necessary" for states to renegotiate cleanup agreements and requirements to meet the Administration's new goals and strategies laid out in the Review and Budget Request.¹
USDOE's Budget Request for 2003 said, "an example of the type of projects identified during the review as candidates for alternate cleanup strategies… are high level waste vitrification projects. The review identified alternative approaches to treating high level waste that would limit vitrification to the highest risk components and pursue alternative treatment approaches to lower risk components". ² The Review called for the use of "grout" (cement) for "stabilizing tank waste" - replacing retrieval and treatment with simply pouring cement into the tanks on top of the waste. The Review also called for opening up Hanford's Mixed Waste disposal landfill to waste from across the nation, which had never been considered in any Environmental Impact Statement.
In March, 2002, USDOE signed a "letter of intent" with the State of Washington and USEPA to negotiate changes to the Hanford Clean-Up Agreement (Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order, also called the "Tri-Party Agreement", or "TPA"). This was accompanied by an announcement by Secretary Abraham that he would agree to flat, or level, funding for Hanford Clean-Up in 2003 at the 2002 level; and, if Washington State agreed to implement changes in a Performance Plan or "work plan" (to be consistent with the national Review and new goals) to be issued on May1st, then Hanford would be eligible for an additional $133 million in cleanup funding for "expedited cleanup".
We are reviewingthat Work Plan, which the USDOE and Washington State agreed to complete negotiations regarding by the end of August, 2002. Thus, the Hanford Plan is reviewed here to provide the public with the understanding of how USDOE will seek to implement its new national goals and strategies in negotiations with Washington State to change the Hanford Clean-Up Agreement.
The public should be aware that there may be public comment on these plans at hearings, required by the TPA, on Hanford's annual Clean-Up Budget Priorities. There will also be hearings on a Hanford Site Solid Waste Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) covering the USDOE's proposed plans - adopted without waiting for the EIS in this Hanford Plan - to bury massive amounts of radioactive wastes (covering three types of radioactive wastes: Low-Level radioactive waste, or "LLW", which may be mildly contaminated soil or extremely radioactive weapons, reactor or research wastes; Mixed Waste, which is LLW mixed with toxic or hazardous wastes that are regulated by Washington State; and, Trans-Uranic wastes (TRU), which include highly dangerous wastes contaminated with Plutonium and other elements heavier than Uranium. Remote Handled (RH) TRU is extremely radioactive.) The new national strategies and goals include opening up Hanford to disposal for all three types of wastes, and for increasing by fivefold the level of TRU contamination required before waste is cleaned up as TRU waste. ³
What is in USDOE's Plan for Hanford:
The region's largest citizens' Hanford watchdog group, Heart of America Northwest, after reviewing the plan, called it "a blueprint to turn the Hanford Reach National Monument and Columbia River into a National Nuclear Waste Sacrifice Zone. Leaving waste in tanks and adding massive amounts of radioactive waste to Hanford's soil is not cleanup."
The plan calls for:
Making Hanford A National Radioactive Waste Dump:
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Importing massive amounts of radioactive waste into Washington State for burial at Hanford in unlined soil trenches4 - we do not allow municipal garbage to be dumped in unlined ditches.
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Importing highly radioactive and long-lived "Trans-Uranic" radioactive wastes to Hanford -officially adopting a scheme that Heart of America Northwest recently discovered through the Freedom of Information Act, and which was reported by the Seattle Post-Intelligencer on April 18;
- USDOE would never dig up, treat and properly dispose of Trans-Uranic wastes buried before 1970, and which are known to be spreading contamination5.
- Documents, obtained by Heart of America Northwest through the Freedom of Information Act, show that USDOE intends to direct its contractors to "make receiving RH-TRU (highly radioactive TRU) a priority over" TPA required Hanford Clean-Up work.
- USDOE has no plan to consider the health and safety impacts of transporting TRU - including Plutonium wastes -- into Washington State, or of storing the wastes at Hanford. (No EIS planned to cover this). "It has a path in, but has no path out from here," said Mike Wilson, Ecology's nuclear waste program manager. Seattle P-I April 18, 2002.
- Reversing Washington State policy and overriding Washington law to import and bury radioactive wastes mixed with toxic and hazardous chemicals from other nuclear weapons and research sites;
- The Hanford Plan calls for burial of 210,000 cubic meters of Mixed LLW - while showing that only 14,000 cubic meters is already stored or expected to be generated from Hanford Clean-Up activities over the planning time frame6. The Plan calls for Records of Decision to be issued for opening the Mixed Waste dumpsite to out of state wastes by the end of January, 2003.7
- The USDOE proposes to restrict public exposure to groundwater for 150 years (detailed in the groundwater section below) because of current and expected contamination from the Central Plateau. The groundwater contamination would exceed health based protection standards all the way to the shores of the Columbia River. Yet, USDOE - without any understanding of the cumulative impacts of adding more wastes to Hanford's soils - proposes in this Plan to expand burial for Mixed and LLW wastes several times. The commercial LLW site (regulated, unlike USDOE's LLW burial grounds) was estimated to pose a risk of fatal cancer in 3% of Native American children exercising Treaty Rights to use the Hanford Reach and ceded lands, under one cap alternative. This was estimated prior to acknowledging that the site had leaked contamination to groundwater in excess of Washington State Clean-Up standards. It is likely that the unregulated, and larger USDOE burial grounds have already leached waste, which was not detected due to the lack of RCRA compliant groundwater and vadose zone monitoring.
Recommendations for Action:
1) Heart of America Northwest urges the State of Washington to restrict the portion of the Hanford Site RCRA Permit for the Mixed Waste burial ground to wastes generated from the cleanup of Hanford. We note that no permit can be issued without an EIS that is legally adequate under Washington's State Environmental Policy Act, and that USDOE has already indicated that it will not include significant impacts and alternatives in its already drafted, but not yet released, Hanford Site Solid Waste EIS. This restriction is consistent with existing State policy and the Federal Facilities Compliance Act. The permit should also include a restriction for the size of the facility to the existing stored 7,000 cubic meters and a documented, reasonable projection of Hanford Clean-Up wastes through the next five years.
2) Washington State should immediately exercise its legal jurisdiction to regulate all landfills into which hazardous/dangerous wastes have been disposed, and any landfill which has released, or is suspected of releasing, hazardous substances. Under Washington's Dangerous Waste Management Act, and the federal RCRA, all of USDOE's Low-Level Burial Grounds should be immediately closed and investigated for releases, with an EIS prepared covering impacts and how to remediate the burial grounds. Under State law, all of USDOE's Low-Level Burial Grounds are illegal unlined disposal facilities, and their use must be discontinued. Heart of America Northwest has documented to Ecology that USDOE continues to ship wastes from offsite generators that are not properly characterized or manifested to prevent additional hazardous wastes from being illegally disposed in Hanford's soil. Further, most of the groundwater monitoring wells around the burial grounds are dry or will be dry within a few years, and that there is no meaningful monitoring to ascertain the extent of contamination already leaching from burial grounds. USDOE's proposal to greatly expand burial of offsite LLW, is both illegal and inconsistent with goals to protect groundwater and future users of the Hanford Reach and National Monument, including Native Americans exercising Treaty rights to use the areas adjacent to the burial grounds.
3) Congress should place an immediate ban on the use of unlined burial grounds for disposal of wastes at USDOE sites. Adding more wastes to the soil only increases future cleanup costs and risks.
High-Level Nuclear Wastes:
High-Level Nuclear Wastes:
- Permanently leaving High-Level Nuclear Wastes in Single Shell Tanks which have already leaked over one million gallons of waste that is seeping towards the Columbia River. The plan calls for pouring cement (grout) into tanks - even before USDOE prepares a legally required Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).
- Contaminated soil and groundwater would not be cleaned up before USDOE declares the tanks "closed" with concrete poured in and walks away forever. Federal and state hazardous waste laws forbid "closing" tanks without emptying all hazardous wastes and cleaning up leaked contamination. The plan implements a Bush Administration "goal", announced last November and with the President's Budget on February 4th, to eliminate vitrification (turning High-Level Nuclear Wastes into glass) of 75% of the nation's High-Level Nuclear Wastes from nuclear weapons production8.
- The Administration's Review claimed that this new scheme would result in "risk reduction" and claimed that vitrification has "negligible public health or environmental benefit" 9over the new strategies for using grout to stabilize tank wastes in place, and using grout and other processes to replace vitrification. Not a single risk analysis or environmental analysis was cited for these claims in the Review. The Hanford Plan would implement these strategies without appropriate analysis and comparison of the new strategies to vitrification.
- The Review claims that it is "acceptable" for all of Hanford's Single Shell Tank wastes (not just the waste in the 69 that are proposed to be "stabilized" and left in the ground) and much of the liquid wastes that will be retrieved from Double Shell Tanks (and for Cesium capsules) to be buried in unlined shallow ditches the way USDOE currently disposes of "Low-Level Waste" at Hanford: "This waste is less hazardous than some low-level waste that is considered acceptable for lower-cost near-surface disposal." 10This is also claimed to justify leaving tank wastes and the tanks themselves sitting where they are in the ground.
- The Review cites no basis for the statement that it is "acceptable" to dispose of the "low-level" wastes (which may, in fact, be either extremely radioactive or extremely long-lived) in unlined soil trenches. ¹¹In fact, this practice is under attack, and only continues because USDOE claims its LLW burial grounds are exempt from regulation.
- The 1996 Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) EIS graphically concluded that leaving waste in tanks would contribute far greater contamination to the groundwater and Columbia River than retrieval and vitrification of wastes. ¹²The EIS reached this conclusion despite the fact that it relied on models that predicted it would take two thousand years for tank leaks to reach groundwater. The EIS was issued a year before USDOE admitted that leaks from the Single Shell Tanks had already reached groundwater.
- As we document below, the groundwater flowing from the Central Plateau is already so contaminated, and expected to grow more so, that USDOE proposes to limit all access to the groundwater to the River shore for 150 years. Yet, USDOE blithely ignores the cumulative impacts of adding more waste to the soil and groundwater from leaving waste in tanks or replacing glassified waste with cement grouts - and follows the national Review strategy's unsupported decision that these impacts are "acceptable".
- The Plan calls for between 60 and 140 Single Shell Tanks to be "closed" by 2018 with unspecified amounts of waste remaining in them. ¹²An earlier draft of the Plan called specifically for 20 tanks to be "closed with their wastes in place" by 2012. 14The Plan still calls for 20 tanks to be closed by 2012.
- For High-Level Nuclear Wastes that are retrieved from tanks, USDOE's plan calls for replacing vitrification of the bulk of the liquid wastes and 75% of the highly radioactive "saltcake" with cement grout or untested waste forms. 15This will divert funding from vitrification, as well as lead to construction of vitrification plants that are not capable of handling the quantities of wastes required.
- USDOE will attempt to reclassify wastes at Hanford, per Bush Administration "Review" released February 4, 2002: On the very last page of Appendix B of the Hanford Plan, the Plan has a USDOE Headquarters "commitment"… "to determine certain wastes do not require permanent isolation" as High-Level Waste. Figure 7 of the Plan shows High-Level Waste "reclassified as mixed Low-Level or TRU". Pages A-10,11 seek classification of waste left in bottom of tanks as "incidental" to avoid retrieval and treatment. --- USDOE's efforts to leave wastes in tanks and reclassify them is the subject of a federal lawsuit brought by NRDC, Snake River Alliance and the Yakama Indian Nation.
- On a positive note, we have long called for the TPA to require vitrification of 20% of tank wastes by 2018, rather than a paltry 10%; and, have formally urged that the TPA not provide until 2011 for completion of "hot commissioning" of the vitrification plants. If melter capacity is not replaced with steam reforming equipment, this Plan clearly shows that 20% would be a conservative compliance requirement for both the High Activity and Low Activity portions of High-Level Waste. 16The Plan includes commitments to complete hot commissioning two years before the date in the latest TPA revision, which had extended the deadline by two years. When the high cost of privatization was eliminated, adding melter capacity and processes to speed throughput and increase the plant reliability became possible. This would be further enhanced if USDOE were not proposing $50 million a year or more to be diverted to fund alternatives to waste retrieval and vitrification.
Failing to Protect the Columbia River from Contamination:
- Never cleaning up the contaminated groundwater that already covers 200 square miles and flows into the Columbia River. The plan claims that USDOE "will restore the Columbia River Corridor". However, the plan calls for allowing groundwater contamination to spread and use "institutional controls" to prevent exposure - for 150 years!!!17
- The contamination will flow into the River, preventing future public access to the shorelines of the Hanford Reach National Monument and endangering the health of Native Americans, who have treaty rights to live along, and fish, the Hanford Reach of the River. The plan actually delays by one year the completion of soil site cleanups along the River, which USDOE promised the public in 1994 to complete by 2011. Plans to implement the Bush Administration's national strategy call for allowing contamination to spread for 150 years, while moving the "point of compliance" for meeting groundwater cleanup standards to the River shore as the contamination spreads.
False Claims Made to Justify Goals:
- The plan repeats the false claim in the Bush Administration's strategic plan for USDOE's cleanup program, that it will "accelerate" completion of Hanford Clean-Up from the year 2070. However, the Hanford Clean-Up Agreement requires emptying the High-Level Waste tanks and completing vitrification by 2028. The plan also repeats false claims about the cost of vitrification (improperly adding costs for the abandoned "privatization" contract approach, which adds $20 billion; and, adding over a decade of costs for tank wastes after the legal deadline of 2028 ).
- While claiming to accelerate Hanford Clean-Up in the interest of saving money, USDOE has formally proposed to delay the shutdown of the FFTF Nuclear Reactor, taking until 2011. By shutting the reactor in 3 years, USDOE would save hundreds of millions of dollars, which are required to be returned for use in cleaning up Hanford.
Avoiding Oversight:
- Avoiding Congressional, Regulatory and Public Oversight: USDOE proposes to allow Hanford managers shift funds appropriated by Congress for specific efforts (i.e., for legally required soil or groundwater cleanup, or tank waste safety work) to any other project without Congressional approval or notice. Current law provides that Hanford managers can shift $5 million once per year between budget control points (broad projects) without notifying Congress. Only the Waste Treatment Plant construction would have its own budget control point.
- This invites repetition of the improper failure to report cost overruns and delays for the Savannah River Tank Waste program. This proposal would eliminate differentiation between tank waste programs under the Office of River Protection and the Richland Field Office. SEE P.45.
- The Plan also calls for increasing contractor "self assessment" and reducing federal oversight for safety and health. SEE Sec. 4.2.6. Yet, it was recently documented that Hanford contractors had violated numerous provisions of the federal rules designed to prevent workers from being exposed to toxic beryllium; and, Fluor deliberately used a detection limit to survey buildings for surface contamination that was 2.5 times above the standard set to protect workers from exposure to beryllium. USDOE's rules and informal safety and health "orders" are not currently enforceable.
Conclusion:
Heart of America Northwest urges the Governors of Washington and Oregon and both states' Congressional Delegations to oppose any effort to make Hanford a National Radioactive Waste Dump and the Bush Administration's scheme to leave High-Level Nuclear Wastes in Tanks.
- The 1996 Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) EIS concluded that leaving waste in tanks ("in situ fill and cap") would dramatically increase long-term groundwater contamination and human health risks. It also concluded that leaving waste, as again proposed by the Bush Administration's Review and the Hanford Plan was illegal: The chart comparing alternatives as to whether a proposal "Meets Waste Disposal Laws, Regulations and Policy" answered "No" for the "In Situ Fill and Cap" alternative and all other alternatives that left waste unretrieved.
- Washington State should refuse to negotiate any change to the requirements to retrieve as much waste as is technically feasible (already known to exceed 99%), and require that "closure" occur only after tanks are fully emptied and all contaminated surrounding soil and equipment is cleaned to existing standards. This should occur after completion of tank waste retrieval and vitrification, to prevent diversion of resources from achieving >20% of wastes retrieved and vitrified by 2018. No closure activity should occur without an EIS.
- The TPA should reflect the capability for full "hot commissioning" to be complete in 2009 and double the current inexcusably low requirement of just ten percent of wastes retrieved and vitrified by 2018 (two years ahead of the current schedule for commissioning. The requirement in the current TPA requiring only 10% of the High-Level Wastes to be vitrified by 2018 - objected to as too low by numerous public comments, was based on the abandoned BNFL contract - and, was limited solely by the incredibly high cost of repaying BNFL for capital investments).
- Melter capacity for vitrification (especially for the LAW facility) should be enhanced, rather than replaced with untested alternative technologies (e.g. steam reforming - which has radioactive salt waste streams that have no known appropriate disposition). Utilizing untested technologies within the footprint of the vitrification plants is unwise while utilizing fast track construction - starting construction before completing design and permitting. It is doubly unwise to replace melter capacity, as proposed, with steam reformation for LAW.
- Congressional Appropriations and Authorizations should: a) require full funding of vitrification plant construction and waste retrieval infrastructure to meet existing TPA requirements; b) preclude USDOE from diverting funding from Waste Treatment Plant construction and the Project Baselines (PBS) for retrieval and safe storage to any technology efforts that would not increase vitrification throughput, and bar use of funds for any planning or work towards any alternative which leaves waste in tanks; and, c) firmly reject the call in the Plan to remove budget control points, which would allow Hanford managers unlimited authority to move funds between any program regardless of Congressional appropriation and intent that funds be used first for compliance.
"Leaving waste in tanks that have already leaked contamination that threatens to poison our Columbia River, and adding more waste to the soil, is not cleanup, no matter what name the Administration gives its scheme," said Gerald Pollet, Executive Director of Heart of America Northwest. "Washington's voters have proven in the past that we won't let USDOE make us into a national radioactive waste dump. Any child can tell you that we can't cleanup this dangerous mess by adding more wastes or trying to hide the wastes by pouring concrete on top of them."
Endnotes Follow
¹ FY 2003 Congressional Budget Request; Environmental Management Executive Summary.
² Id.
³ "some low-level TRU waste may be safe for disposal in a manner similar to low-level" waste, claimed the Review at IV-2.
However, the reasons for differentiating between TRU and LLW include that the elements in TRU are extremely long-lived, and often easily dispersible in the environment (e.g., Plutonium). This makes burial of TRU an extreme long-term threat to contaminate groundwater and to be spread by infiltrating animals, vegetation or humans. See also Review at V-11, regarding seeking alternatives to retrieval and treatment for TRU at concentrations between 100 nanocuries per gram and 500 nanocuries per gram. The current rule requires treating and disposing of waste as TRU if it exceeds 100 nanocuries/gm. This issue has implications for High-Level Waste Tank retrieval and treatment decisions as well. The Review calls for reclassification of wastes and treating some as TRU. Under the Review's Call to Action, and as proposed for implementation in the Hanford Plan, a portion of tank wastes would be left forever in tanks after being reclassified as TRU, and others would be buried after retrieval. SEE Plan Appendix B-5; and Figure 7, which shows High-Level Tank Waste "reclassified as mixed Low-Level or TRU" to justify leaving tank wastes in place - and presumably leaving TRU in soil beneath the tanks.
4 The Plan illegally calls for the pending Hanford Site Solid Waste EIS to justify USDOE's proposal to import and bury 340,000 cubic meters of Low-Level Waste (LLW) - a figure that is several times higher than any prior proposal - without even considering the results of the Environmental Impact Statement process. These proposals would more than double the waste at Hanford.
USDOE continues to plan to import and bury at Hanford wastes that are not even from USDOE facilities.
Likewise, the Plan calls for burial of 210,000 cubic meters of Mixed LLW - while showing that only 14,000 cubic meters is already stored or expected to be generated from Hanford Clean-Up activities over the planning time frame. Plan at A-19. The Plan calls for Records of Decision to be issued for opening the Mixed Waste dumpsite to out of state wastes by the end of January, 2003. Id at A-20. The Plan notes that the Low-Level Burial Grounds and Central Waste Complex are not in compliance with 10 CFR 830. Id.
5 There is significant discussion in the Plan regarding "retrieval" of TRU - referring to TRU wastes stored retrievably on pads since 1970. This should not be confused with buried TRU or TRU contaminated soil. The Review stated that "some low-level TRU waste may be safe for disposal in a manner similar to low-level" waste. Review at IV-2. Low-Level Waste is currently disposed in unlined, and virtually unmonitored, soil trenches with no leachate collection. Thus, the Review's call for increasing by fivefold the concentration of TRU allowable in soil or to be classified as LLW, rather than as TRU (which is has not been allowed to be buried in unlined soil ditches since a 1970 decision by the AEC), represents a massive increase in potential risk for groundwater, the environment, and future populations exposed to contaminated soils or groundwater. Yet, USDOE has refused to perform an EIS on this proposal. Request made in meetings and phone calls with Alliance for Nuclear Accountability citizen group representatives, including Heart of America Northwest. The ANA and Heart of America Northwest's formal request for USDOE to prepare Environmental Impact Statements before basing budget or site specific plan decisions (such as seeking changes to agreements) on the new goals and strategies in the Review was formally rejected by USDOE in a letter from Asst. Secretary Roberson to the ANA on Feb. 22, 2002.
6Plan at A-19
7 Id at A-20.
8 [See Sec. 2.2.Ie, 2.2.IIa, App. A re seeking to avoid EIS before "closing" tanks].
9 Review at V-8.
¹º Review at V-8.
¹¹ Id. ORP briefing to USDOE Headquarters Management and briefing presentations for C3T and public identify 69 tanks as meeting standard defining Class C Low-Level Waste, which USDOE buries at Hanford.
¹² E.g., SEE Figure S.6.2 "Groundwater Pathways by Alternative".
¹³ Plan at A-9, Item 2.2.Io.
14 Washington Department of Ecology to USDOE, April 8, 2002, at page 2.
15 Plan at P. 18.
16 Appendix A; SEE: 2.1.Ik; 2.i.Im
17 "Hanford Site Central Plateau Risk Framework", USDOE March 12, 2002: "Due to the existing plumes, the GW (Ground Water) must be restricted for at least 150 years; based on existing and projected contamination plumes."
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Funding for this publication is provided in part by a Public Participation Grant from the Washington State Department of Ecology. The Department of Ecology has reviewed this material for consistency with the purposes of the grant only. Funding by the Department does not constitute an endorsement of opinions, conclusions or recommendations expressed herein. Production by Heart of America Northwest. |